Community trading with shared execution

1.1What this is

This document describes a new type of social trading platform where groups of friends, communities and eventually KOL audiences trade together rather than copying each other after the fact. A group of people enter and exit a position through one combined transaction instead of a sequence of separate ones. A member proposes a trade, the other members choose how much they want to put in during a short commitment window, and the aggregated order is executed once. Every participant receives a proportional share of that execution.

The components underneath are familiar. Smart accounts hold each member's funds, an order layer collects commitments before anything reaches the public chain, and a routing path decides where the combined order is filled. The product those components support is easier to describe than the components themselves: someone proposes a trade, everyone commits, and the group enters together. The technology underneath exists to make that experience fair, fast and non custodial.

1.2The problem with sharing trades

Social trading today gives the person who acts first a structural advantage over everyone who hears about the trade afterwards. Someone finds a token and buys it. They then share it with friends, with a group chat, with followers, or with the users of a platform. By the time the rest of the group buys, the entries have already drifted.

The first buyer has the best entry. The second gets a slightly worse one. The tenth gets worse again. In a thin market, the hundredth participant can end up providing the liquidity the earlier ones sell into. The effect is most obvious in small, high velocity tokens, where even modest orders move the price.

1.3Why copy trading does not fix it

Copy trading automates the follower's side of the process, but the order of events does not change. The leader executes, the follower's system detects the transaction, and the follower executes afterwards. Even when that happens in a fraction of a second, the follower is still behind the original trade. The faster and thinner the market, the more that gap costs.

1.4The model

Instead of copying a trade after it happens, members participate in the original trade. A member proposes a position. The group is given a short commitment window. Each member chooses an amount. The platform aggregates the commitments and executes the combined order once, then allocates the result proportionally.

1.5A worked example

Five people want the same token and each has 200 dollars to put in. Trading separately, they send five orders into the same pool, and each order moves the price for the next one.

Through the platform, the same five commitments form a single order.

One execution takes place and the tokens are distributed pro rata between the five members. Nobody is positioned ahead of anybody else, and no member's fill is made worse by another member's order arriving first.

1.6What shared execution means

The accurate description is shared execution rather than a single identical spot price. A large order against an automated market maker fills across several price levels because of slippage, and combining orders does not remove that. What changes is that the whole group takes part in the same aggregated transaction and is allocated from the same result.

If the aggregated order settles at an average of 0.0104, every participant is allocated at that group average in proportion to what they committed. Clicking two seconds earlier than someone else confers no advantage.

1.7Trading Clans

The consumer facing concept is Trading Clans. Rather than explaining ERC-4337 powered collaborative execution with an internal mempool, the product is described in three steps.

A clan could initially be five friends. Eventually it could be 5,000 people following the same trader. The rest of this document uses clan for that unit, whatever its size.

2.1Clan structure and roles

A clan is the unit that holds members, proposals and history. Anyone meeting the required platform or token tier can create one, so that public clans carry some cost to establish. A clan carries a name, a profile, a leader, its members and a running record of what it has traded. Over time this turns clans themselves into discoverable trading identities.

A clan does not need a single dictator. A workable set of roles is a founder who owns the clan settings, approved traders who may propose positions, analysts who contribute research without proposal rights, and members who decide for themselves whether to join any given trade. The same structure works for five friends and for a community of several thousand.

• Name, profile and leader
• Member list and roles
• Trade history with realised and unrealised results
• PnL, win rate, volume and average trade duration
• Favourite markets
• Reputation derived from executed trades

2.2Proposing a trade

A proposal is a small set of parameters that fully describes what the clan is being asked to join. It states the side, the asset, how much the proposer is aiming to raise, how long members have to decide, and the conditions under which the trade should be abandoned.

2.3Committing to a proposal

Members are not required to contribute equal amounts. One person commits 100 dollars, another 500, another 2,000. The platform combines the commitments and allocates the resulting position pro rata, which preserves individual position sizing while keeping the execution shared.

Fast trades do not need governance. A proposal stays open for something in the range of 20 to 60 seconds. Anyone who wants in commits, anyone who does not simply lets it pass, and the trade executes on the terms already published. Introducing a vote would add delay to the part of the process that is most sensitive to it.

Members watch the order fill in real time, which is also what makes a proposal feel like a shared event rather than a private decision.

Each proposal can carry its own discussion alongside the chart, liquidity, market capitalisation, the proposer's track record, the amount committed so far and the time remaining. The conversation that already happens in a group chat sits directly next to the decision it relates to.

2.4Coordinated exits

The same mechanism works in reverse. A clan can propose selling a quarter of the position or exiting it entirely. Participating members' holdings are combined into the sell order and the proceeds are distributed proportionally. The product is not only about entering together, it covers the whole life of a position.

2.5Private clans, then public

The first version should target private clans. Five friends who already share trades in a chat every day have an obvious use for it. Instead of one person announcing a buy and everyone else pasting a contract address into a separate application, one person proposes and everyone gets the same opportunity to join.

Public clans make the model considerably more interesting. A strong trader or KOL creates a clan, say The Trenches, with 1,700 members. Instead of buying first and tweeting afterwards, they propose the trade through the clan. Members opt in, the order is aggregated, and everyone enters through the same execution.

2.6The group chat becomes the trading account

This is one of the strongest ways to explain the product. Trading communities already exist on Telegram, Discord, X groups, WhatsApp and private chats. The problem is that they communicate together but execute separately. The platform connects those two things.

2.7Reputation and leaderboards

Because every clan trade is an actual execution recorded by the platform, clan performance can be calculated from fills rather than from screenshots posted by traders. That is the meaningful difference between this and existing performance claims.

Example clan profile. Figures are illustrative.

Individual proposers accumulate their own records alongside the clan. One person may be consistently good at finding new memes, another at larger cap positions, another at calling exits. Over time the platform builds a social graph of trading skill that is grounded in settled trades.

Once enough trades happen, clans can compete. Leaderboards let users discover:

• Best performing clans today
• Best 7 day performance
• Best meme traders
• Best new token traders
• Highest win rate
• Highest volume
• Most consistent
• Best risk adjusted performance

This introduces a social game layer on top of the execution product.

3.1The internal order layer

Commitments are collected off chain before the final trade is exposed to the public network. Members register intent, the platform combines those intents into one order, and only the resulting transaction is broadcast.

The chain sees one execution rather than four accounts announcing in sequence what they are about to do. That is both better for the fills and a smaller surface for anyone watching the mempool for predictable follow on flow.

3.2Minimum execution thresholds

A proposal can require a minimum before it executes at all. If the target is 20,000 dollars with a minimum of 10,000, and only 4,000 is committed when the window closes, the proposal expires and nobody trades. This protects a proposer who intended to open a meaningful group position from ending up with a token position sized for a fraction of it.

3.3Price bounds and cancellation

A proposal can also carry a price boundary. If the maximum entry is set at 0.0042 and the token trades through that level before the window closes, the trade is cancelled. Members are not committed to whatever the market does in the twenty seconds after they clicked, only to the terms they agreed to.

3.4Routing

Over time the protocol can decide where an order is best filled rather than sending everything to one venue. The clan forms an order, the protocol checks available liquidity and routes, and the trade is executed where the terms are best. That is what turns the platform into an execution layer rather than another interface onto a single exchange.

3.5Execution protection

Because the protocol controls the path an order takes, it can apply protections that individual traders rarely apply for themselves.

• Private transaction submission
• Routing that accounts for extractable value
• Slippage limits enforced at the order level
• Price impact caps on aggregated size
• Bundled execution
• Reverting when conditions change before the transaction lands

4.1Non custodial by design

Members should never transfer their bankroll into a wallet controlled by the clan leader. Each trader keeps ownership of their own account and assets, and the platform coordinates permissions and execution across those accounts. A clan leader has the ability to propose and to execute within agreed limits, never unrestricted access to member funds.

4.2Programmable accounts

Account abstraction, in the form of ERC-4337 smart accounts, is what makes that possible. Rather than granting custody, a member authorises a specific and bounded set of actions that the account itself enforces.

Example permission set. These are enforced by the account, not by the interface.

4.3Session permissions

Speed matters for this kind of trading. Nobody wants to open a wallet, confirm, wait, and confirm again every time a token starts moving. A member can create a session permission scoped to a particular clan, with its own limits and expiry, so that joining a proposal is a single action. The result feels like a normal consumer trading application while the member keeps self custody.

4.4Risk controls

Risk settings should be a primary feature rather than a page in the settings menu, and because they live in the smart account they are enforced rather than advisory.

• Maximum size for a single trade
• Daily spend ceiling
• Maximum share of portfolio in one position
• Maximum slippage
• Minimum liquidity and market capitalisation for eligible assets
• Stop loss rules and whether automated exits are permitted
• Approved clans and approved traders

4.5Clan identity onchain

If clans eventually become objects on chain, token bound accounts under ERC-6551 give them somewhere to live. A clan would be represented by an NFT with its own token bound account, carrying trade history, reputation, positions, achievements, governance rights, membership information and a potential treasury. The Trenches is then not merely a Telegram group. It becomes an onchain trading entity with a verifiable history. This belongs in phase two and is not needed to prove the core mechanism.

5.1Role of the token

Requiring the token to be spent on every trade adds friction and makes the product feel built around the token rather than the other way round. A freemium model with locked tiers is a better fit. The token governs access, limits and advanced functionality, and stays out of the trading path itself.

5.2Access tiers

An indicative structure, with thresholds to be set later once usage data exists.

5.3Creator lock

Clan creators can lock tokens behind the clans they run, which adds a second reputation signal alongside performance. A serious public clan is likely to lock a meaningful amount. Someone who constantly creates poor quality pump clans and abandons them has visibly little economic commitment. Slashing should not be introduced at the start, since it raises a much harder set of questions about who decides what counts as misconduct.

5.4Access is not custody

5.5Revenue

The platform can earn from a small execution or platform fee rather than depending entirely on token demand, alongside premium functionality, professional clan tooling, advanced execution features and API access.

The fee level needs modelling before launch. The product exists to improve fills, so a fee large enough to consume the improvement removes the reason to use it.

6.1Audience led growth

KOL access is particularly valuable because the product naturally uses KOLs rather than treating them as a marketing channel bolted on afterwards. The pitch is not a request to tweet about a new platform. It is an invitation to create their own trading clan and invite their community. Their community becomes users because they are participating in something with the KOL, which is a much stronger acquisition loop than paid promotion.

6.2Launch venue and liquidity partners

The LetCash and CashCat relationship provides the launch venue. Their team has agreed to help support and send the launch, which gives the product initial users, a trading native audience, credibility, distribution and technical support during the launch itself. That is worth considerably more here than launching into an empty ecosystem, because the product needs groups of active traders on day one to demonstrate anything at all.

A market making relationship matters beyond supporting the token. Market makers can contribute directly to the core product on execution quality, liquidity, routing, slippage behaviour, protection around larger aggregated orders and general market structure.

6.3Starting market

The right place to start is high velocity, socially traded tokens, because that is where the problem is most visible. Nobody minds getting an entry on a large and liquid asset two seconds after a friend. People mind a great deal when a token moves fifteen percent while ten members of the same group are trying to buy it.

6.4Position relative to discovery apps

Rather than competing with token discovery applications by building another one, this sits on top of the behaviour those applications created. They made trading a social activity. This adds coordination to the activity they already produced, which is a different job and does not require winning the discovery race.

6.5Telegram and messaging apps

The model fits Telegram particularly well, because that is where trading groups already talk. A member proposes a trade and the bot posts a card showing the token, the amount committed so far, the number of participants and the time remaining, with a single control to join. The member taps once and their smart account handles the rest.

6.6Automated participation and agents

Once a member trusts a particular clan or trader, they can enable automatic participation within their own limits: join this trader's proposals with 100 dollars, at most five trades a day, stop at 300 dollars of daily loss, only tokens above 500,000 dollars of liquidity. This captures what people want from copy trading while still routing them through the coordinated group execution.

The same interface eventually accepts agents. A clan can allow an agent to propose trades, or a member can set a rule to participate whenever three proposers they trust agree on the same asset. That turns clans into coordination networks for both humans and agents. This should not lead the product story, because the human version is already easy to explain.

7.1Minimum viable product

The first release does not need most of what is described above. It needs to answer one question.

If that runs smoothly and members can see their position afterwards, the rest of the product has something solid to build on. If it does not, no amount of additional features will help.

7.2Phase two

Once shared execution works reliably, the following can be layered on in roughly this order.

• Public clans, clan profiles and verified track records
• Leaderboards and discovery
• Automated participation within member set limits
• Advanced account permissions and session scopes
• Telegram integration
• Token tiers
• Better routing and execution protection

7.3Phase three

Longer term this becomes much larger than meme trading. The coordination layer is not specific to one asset class. The same mechanism applies anywhere several people want exposure to the same position at the same time.

• Spot tokens
• Tokenised equities
• Prediction markets
• Perpetual positions
• Liquidity positions
• Portfolio baskets

7.4The bigger vision

The ultimate product is not another copy trading platform. It is a coordination layer for trading communities. Today communities talk together and trade separately, and the gap between those two things is where followers lose money. Closing that gap is the whole product.

That is the actual new behaviour.

Stated in one sentence: Trading Clans lets friends and communities enter trades together through one aggregated execution, giving everyone proportional exposure to the same trade instead of forcing followers to chase whoever bought first.